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Abstract - We empirically investigate the impact of a vast array of public policies on 
wireline broadband penetration through a novel and unique dataset covering 30 OECD 
countries, over 1995-2010. We find that while both supply and demand-side policies have 
a positive effect on broadband penetration, their relative impact depends on the actual 
stage of broadband diffusion. When an advanced stage is reached, only demand-side 
policies appear to generate a positive and increasing effect. Moreover, both technological 
and market competition play a positive role, and the effect of the latter shows a non-linear 
path along the stage of market development. Finally, the relative weight of the service 
sector in the national economy reveals to be crucial for broadband penetration. Our 
analysis provides new insights into the policy debate and in particular on the rationale of 
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1. Introduction 
Broadband infrastructures are increasingly perceived as a key factor influencing the 
competitiveness and the growth potential of nations, facilitating job creation. In Germany, for 
instance, it has been estimated (CBS, 2010) that an investment of 36 billion euros will return 
about 22 billion euros to the economy during network construction, as well as positive 
externalities for the whole economy equal to 137 billion.  In China, the development of dial-up 
and broadband Internet may contribute an extra 2.5 per cent increase in the growth of gross 
domestic product, for each 10% raise in penetration (VP, 2009). Other studies suggest that, for 
low- and middle-income countries, a 10-per cent rise in broadband penetration could add up to a 
1.4-per cent point rise in economic growth (BCDD, 2011, pp. 6-7). According to these predictions, 
countries urge to implement national broadband plans or risk losing the benefits of the global 
high-speed digital communications.  
In view of the perceived salience, also within public opinion, of the issue of broadband 
deployment, most governments around the world have adopted policy interventions aimed at 
promoting investment. Almost all OECD countries have enacted more or less intense policy 
measures, often in the form of integrated plans requiring the coordination of action at various 
government levels, with some countries such as South Korea, Japan, the Netherlands, UK and, 
more recently, Australia, showing particularly high degrees of activism.  
The relevance of broadband diffusion for economic activity relates to the range of new and/or 
better applications that it enables. These include not only enhanced communication services and 
video streaming, but also new services in the domain of e-commerce, e-health, e-government and 
e-education, just to mention the most prominent examples. In addition to this, broadband is 
widely believed to be a factor stimulating productivity growth, with positive consequences in 
terms of economic development, and to have positive effects in terms of social cohesion.  
In spite of the relatively uncontroversial recognition of the benefits of the existence of 
efficient broadband infrastructures, the nature and extent of public policy intervention is still the 
object of many economic, political and regulatory debates. Three main objectives of broadband 
public policy could be outlined (BCDD, 2011): extending the geographic coverage of broadband 
to areas currently not covered because of high costs of doing so (i.e. reducing or eliminating the 
so-called digital divide); promoting broadband adoption by the largest possible number of citizens; 
and improving the technological performance of existing networks by introducing ultra-
broadband infrastructures.  
In the past few years, different governments have not only chosen different combinations 
of the above objectives, but they have also adopted a particularly wide range of forms of 
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interventions. Our findings show that demand-side and supply-side policies are complementary in 
this respect, being more effective if jointly undertaken. Finally, we find that, in addition to 
policies purposefully devised to stimulate broadband investment, a particularly relevant role 
should be attributed to the wider institutional environment the countires face when enacting their 
policies, as our analysis reveal that institutional characteristics play the role of "enabling" factors. 
In particular, we find that while both supply and demand-side policies have a positive effect on 
broadband diffusion at a lower stage of broadband penetration, when an advanced stage is 
reached, only demand-side policies appear to generate a positive and increasing effect. Moreover, 
both technological and market competition play a positive role, and the effect of the latter shows a 
non-linear path along the stage of market development, as public policies exert different effects on 
broadband adoption at different levels of the telecommunications market development. Finally, 
the relative weight of the service sector in the national economy reveals to be crucial for 
broadband adoption, showing a greater impact as the dimension of the service sector increases. 
To our knowledge, there is currently no study, besides the present one, that explicitly 
addresses the issue of the impact of alternative forms of public policy intervention on broadband 
penetration, while acknowledging the role played by ‘institutional’ initial conditions in affecting 
the policies’ performance. Our results may shed new lights on the policy debate, in particular over 
the definition of the most appropriate, country-specific policy design to be adopted for broadband 
promotion and, in perspective, for the rollout of next-generation networks.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing empirical 
literature that, although focusing more generally on the determinants of broadband penetration, 
is broadly related to the present paper. In Section 3, an overview of the main public policy tools 
for the promotion of broadband investment is provided. Section 4 illustrates the data used in this 
study and describes the variables. Section 5 contains our econometric analysis and outlines our 
findings. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Previous empirical literature on broadband penetration policies 
While a precise definition of wireline broadband is difficult to find due to the rapid evolution of 
technology and the existence of a range of alternative interpretations by different institutions, an 
acceptable way to define wireline broadband is by reference to what broadband connectivity is not, 
namely a dial-up service for access to the Internet, and to what broadband is for sure, namely a 
way for consumers to enjoy high speed, two-way and always-on connectivity to the Internet. In 
other words, the availability of a broadband infrastructure implies the possibility to connect to the 
Internet at a faster speed than conventional dial-up services. About how much faster such   4
connection should be to qualify, as broadband there is, however, no agreement. The International 
Telecommunications Union, for instance, defines as broadband Internet connectivity faster than 
that affordable with primary rate ISDN, i.e. 1,5 or 2 Mbps (see the Recommendation I.113 of the 
ITU Standardization Sector - ITU-T). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, by contrast, in various official documents has made reference to the lower threshold 
of a download speed of 256 Kbps (OECD, 2001). 
Irrespective of the precise definition, wireline broadband services may be delivered through 
various different technologies1, whose diffusion has been the focus of a growing body of empirical 
research. In particular, three broad categories of studies addressing the issue of broadband 
deployment can be singled out:  
(a) studies that investigate the determinants of broadband demand;  
(b) studies that consider both supply and demand factors by examining the link between 
population characteristics, infrastructure investments and broadband access;  
(c)  studies that examine the link between regulatory policy choices and broadband 
investment and/or uptake.  
 
The first category of studies (a), generally uses micro-data, where the statistical unit is the 
household and the dependent variable is a binary choice (i.e. the use of a broadband/dial-up 
Internet connection). Trying to address the determinants of demand, this first body of research 
focuses on household characteristics (such as household size, income, age and education) while, on 
the supply side, only the price of broadband and dial-up service is included. For example, in the 
study by Rappaport et al. (2003), multinomial logistic models are implemented on a sample of 
about 20.000 US households and it is found that education and income level positively affect 
broadband use in individual households. Probabilistic models have been also used to examine 
individual households’ decisions, and broadband adoption by Madden and Simpson (1997) and 
Madden et al. (1999) for Australia, Takanori and Toshifumi (2006) for Japan, Cerno and Pérez-
Amaral (2007) for Spain, and Cardona et al. (2009) for Austria. 
The second category of studies (b), focuses on the geographical digital divide and on the 
reasons of spatial disparities rather than on the choice of individual households and considers 
demand characteristics as a determinant of telecommunication firms’ investments in specific 
                                                        
1 The most widespread technology is, so far, the Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) technology, which relies on the existing 
telecommunication copper network to provide connection speeds ranging from 256 Kbps to 52 Mbps, depending on 
the specific type of DSL (Asymmetric DSL (ADSL), High Rate DSL (HDSL), Symmetric DSL (SDSL) and Very High 
Data Rate DSL (VDSL)). The second most widespread technology is the Cable Modem, which provides faster 
connection speeds than the DSL (in the range of 1 to 10 Mbps), allowing for the simultaneous passage on the TV 
cable of triple-play services: voice, data and television.  Other relevant technologies for the provision of wireline 
broadband services include Power Line Communications (PLC, based on the electricity transmission network), and, 
most importantly in terms of quality and potential, Optic Fibre. Deployment of the latter allows the building of an 
Internet Protocol-based network that is normally referred to as Next Generation Network.   5
areas. Grubesic (2003) explores broadband access options in the state of Ohio (in the USA) and 
finds that income, education, age, location and competition from alternative broadband platforms 
influence DSL infrastructure investment leading to a urban/rural divide. Similarly, Bauer et al. 
(2003), implementing a supply-demand model on a sample of 30 OECD countries, show that the 
potential demand (along with cost conditions of deploying advanced networks) is one of the most 
influential factors explaining broadband uptake, although the relative income position appears not 
significant in their estimation.  
In a more recent paper, Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) implement a supply-
demand model similar to that of Bauer et al. (2003) and provide more robust results. The two 
authors examine a sample of 30 OECD countries from 2000 to 2002 and explore the factors 
influencing broadband demand, supply and adoption. By performing multivariate regression 
analysis, Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) find that technological competition and the 
low cost of deploying telecommunication infrastructures are likely to be the key drivers for 
broadband supply, while the predisposition to use new technologies is the crucial determinant of 
broadband demand. In particular, they show a positive correlation between broadband 
penetration, on the one hand, and income, household density, population density, urban 
population, education and competition between technologies, on the other. By contrast, market 
competition (measured by the percentage of telephone lines of new entrants) does not seem to 
have a significant influence on the availability of broadband infrastructures for DSL or for cable 
technology. Nevertheless, other studies (see, e.g., Garcia-Murillo and Gabel, 2003) report a 
positive and statistically significant effect of market competition on the percentage of broadband 
users in a given country. Finally, that private and business demand drives broadband investments 
and penetration, is also found by Prieger (2003) on US data. Prieger extends his analysis to some 
proxies for the composition of the business market (considering the percentage of manufacturing 
and services firms and firms’ dimension) that, however, do not show statistically significant 
effects.  
  As for the third category of studies (c), it includes investigations of the link between price 
regulation and investment (see, e.g., Greenstein et al., 1995; Ai and Sappington, 2002), showing 
that incentive regulation regimes have a better performance with respect to RoR regulation in 
terms of investment incentives. It also includes analyses of the link between access regulation and 
investment, and particularly of the effect of local loop unbundling on investment. The empirical 
evidence is not univocal on this issue. Indeed, some studies find that mandatory unbundling has a 
negative effect on investment (see, e.g., Crandall et al., 2004; Wallsten and Hausladen, 2009), 
while others find evidence supporting the existence of non-negative effects on investment (see, 
e.g., Ford and Spiwak, 2004; Fevrier and Saer, 2007; Distaso et al., 2005).    6
As mentioned above, despite the rich array of results provided by these empirical studies, a 
systematic analysis of the role played by policy interventions, different from regulatory choices, is 
still missing. This might be due, on the one hand, to the limited availability of data, that strongly 
constrains empirical models on this issue (especially when one tries to introduce policy variables), 
and forces researchers to caution in interpreting estimation results. On the other hand, it may 
derive from the fact that the few available results do not appear to be particularly encouraging. 
Bauer et al. (2003), for example, add to their econometric model some dummies reflecting policy 
regimes (that include unbundling, the separation of cable and telephone company ownership, and 
the availability of government funding to support broadband deployment), which, however, do 
not produce statistically significant parameter estimates. Similarly, a comparative study of 
broadband diffusion in Asia by Aizu (2002), reports that government policies do not have much 
influence in promoting broadband use. Nevertheless, tax incentives to encourage firms to serve 
underserved markets are suggested by some authors (see, for instance, Gabel and Kwan, 2002) 
along with "medium-intervention strategies" involving both supply-side actions to assist in the 
establishment of broadband networks and demand-side actions to promote broadband service 
adoption (Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz, 2006). 
Building on these previous empirical studies we attempt, in the following sections, to 
overcome the above difficulties and to investigate some issues left unexplored by the previous 
research. We perform a new empirical analysis of the impact of alternative public policies on 
wireline broadband promotion, based on a unique and original database, covering the vst array of 
policy options adopted in 30 OECD countries from 1995 to 2010.  
 
3.  Identifying a comprehensive set of broadband policy tools 
Before starting our econometric analysis, we need to identify and disentangle the many 
broadband policy tools, which might be adopted in each country at different levels of government.  
The range of policy instruments available to public decision-makers, to stimulate wireline 
broadband penetration, includes at least three sets of tools.  
The first concerns directly the domain of telecommunications regulation and is made up of the 
various regulatory interventions that may contribute to create an investment-friendly regulatory 
environment. Among these, at least three sorts of measures have attracted considerable attention: 
(a) regulatory measures aimed at directly modifying the degree of vertical integration of the 
existing telecommunications network by introducing operational, functional or structural 
separation of the incumbent’s network; (b) access regulation; and (c) incentive regulation. There is   7
a vast, albeit not conclusive, theoretical and empirical literature on these topics, particularly on 
the effects of access and incentive regulation on broadband investment (for a comprehensive 
survey, see Cambini and Jiang, 2009).  
The second set of tools includes a varied ensemble of supply-side policy measures that may lower 
the cost of private investment, integrate it or substitute for it in scarcely attractive areas. The 
third includes demand-side policy measures aimed at increasing the revenue side of broadband 
investment projects either by stimulating business and/or consumer demand or by expressing 
additional public demand. The latter two sets of policy tools can be categorized as “industrial 
policies” (Figure 2), as opposed to regulatory measures2.  
 
Figure 2. 
SUPPLY-SIDE POLICIES D EMAND-SIDE POLICIES 
     
·  adoption of fiscal incentives programs and subsidies    ·  initiatives of public demand of specific services 
·  implementation of long-term loans programs for 
broadband suppliers and national financing 
programs 
  ·  provision of incentives to business demand 
·  creation of Public-Private Partnerships with public 
ownership of the infrastructure network 
  ·  provision of incentives to private demand 
·  creation of Public-Private Partnerships with private 
ownership of the infrastructure network 
  ·  provision of demand subsidies in favor of individual 
consumers or particular categories of consumers 
·  implementation of territorial mapping programs    ·  adoption of demand aggregation policies 
·  initiatives of administrative simplification     
 
In the rest of this section, the main forms of industrial policy intervention will be briefly 
reviewed, so as to better introduce the policies that will be taken into account in the empirical 
analysis. Regulatory measures are outside the scope of the empirical assessment and will therefore 
not be reviewed.   
 
 
3.1  Supply-side policies 
 
Supply-side industrial policies include a varied range of policy tools that express different levels 
of financial commitment by public decision-makers and have been adopted in various different 
                                                        
2 There are a number of categorizations of the forms of policy interventions available to governments for the 
promotion of broadband penetration different from the one we adopt in this paper. Gillett et al. (2004), for instance, 
propose a taxonomy of forms of intervention based on the role played by the state, distinguishing among contexts 
whereby the state operates as a (1) broadband user; (2) rule-maker; (3) financier; or (4) infrastructure developer. Falch 
(2007) introduces a distinction among (1) direct intervention; (2) regulation; and (3) facilitation. Other categorizations 
are also possible. We adopt the distinction between supply-side and demand-side policies because it is the most 
common in public policy analysis and because it appears to be particularly salient in the current debate.   8
combinations by OECD countries. In what follows, each of the most common forms of supply-
side policies will be briefly described. 
 
 
Fiscal incentives programs and subsidies.  
Under this label can be listed the fiscal measures aimed at stimulating broadband supply, such as 
tax credits (adopted particularly in the US) and subsidies to broadband providers (such as, for 
instance, in Canada). 
 
Long-term loans programs for broadband suppliers and national financing programs.  
Korea and Japan have historically been the countries most prone to finance initiatives for 
improving broadband penetration (among the most relevant programs in this regard are the "KII-
initiative", the "IT839 Strategy" and the "Broadband Korea vision 2007" for Korea and "U-Japan" 
and "The Next Generation Broadband Strategy 2010" for Japan). More recently, almost all of the 
other OECD countries have followed suit, either through central government guarantees and/or 
long-term loans to TLC operators (this has occurred, among other countries, in the US, with the 
plans "Rural Broadband Access Loan" and "Guarantees Program", and in Spain, with the plans 
"Avanza Plan" and "Ingenio 2010"), or through the financing of local administrations involved in 
the creation of new infrastructures or in the improvement of existing ones, often with the aim of 
filling the technological gap of rural areas (this has occurred particularly in Norway, with the 
plan "Broadband for all", in Greece, where the State has financed the realization of a new backbone 
network and, more generally, in a number of EU countries where EU structural funds are used to 
finance the development of underdeveloped areas).  
 
Public-Private Partnerships.  
Public funds may also be involved in the creation of Public-Private Partnerships (hereinafter, 
PPPs), although they do not constitute an essential element of these agreements. Recourse to 
PPPs is, indeed, often motivated by the public sector’s objective to attract private capital towards 
infrastructure financing, so as to complement or substitute for limited public resources. PPPs may 
take many different forms, associated to different degrees of involvement of public players. In 
some cases, often denominated Private Finance Initiatives o r  D B F O  ( Design-Build-Finance-
Operate), financial resources are predominantly of a private nature. In other cases, the presence of 
public capitals is more substantial. This is the case for PPPs in the form of DBO (Design-Build-
Operate), BOT (Build-Operate and Transfer), BT (Build and Transfer), BRT (Build-Rent and   9
Transfer). In the latter cases the infrastructure is typically owned by the public sector and 
maintained and operated by the private sector on an open access basis.  
Relevant examples of the adoption of PPPs include the experience of CityNet in 
Amsterdam, the experience of "FibreSpeed" and "Connected Community" in the UK, a range of cases 
in France, where a specific legal framework has been set in place and, more recently, the cases of 
New Zealand and Australia, where the government has adopted plans to institute PPPs for the 
deployment of fibre networks of an FTTH type (Fibre-to-the-Home), with a substantial input of 
public funds.  In particular, the Australian National Broadband Network of April 2009 envisaged an 
investment of 23.6 billion euros in order to cover 90% of the population through an NGN that 
operates only at the wholesale level. In New Zealand, the government has proposed in 2009 to 
finance up to 50% of the costs of a new broadband access network that would cover 75% of the 
population.  
 
Territorial mapping programs.  
These are public initiatives aimed at supporting investment decisions by private operators by 
providing detailed information on the existing broadband coverage and eventually on the 
potential demand expressed in different geographic locations of the country. Notable initiatives in 
this regard include those undertaken in Norway, in Sweden, where the Swedish IT Policy Group 
has promoted the implementation of a public register of excavations made by local 
administrations, and in Korea, where since 1997 a system of certification has been put in place that 
assigns a higher score to buildings connected through optic fibre ("Cyber Building Certificate") so as 
to transmit information to telecom operators and, at the same time, provide incentives to real 
estate developers to coordinate with telcos to include fiber optic connections in new buildings. 
 
Administrative simplification.  
A number of OECD countries has adopted initiatives aimed at reducing the bureaucratic costs 
involved by broadband investments, such as those relating to excavation permits, rights of way 
and various other sorts of licenses. Examples of adoption of this sort of policies date back to the 
beginning of the 1990s and include the 1991 Belgian law on road public works, the 1993   
Canadian Telecommunications Act, that includes special provisions for civil infrastructure works, 





3.2  Demand-side policies 
The broadband-related objective pursued through the adoption of demand-side policies has been 
at least twofold. On one side, these policies have been used to stimulate the take-up of existing 
broadband infrastructures. On the other side, they have been used to increase the profitability of 
investors’ business plans for the roll-out of Next Generation Networks, thus allowing areas 
where investment would not have been sustainable absent public intervention to become 
profitable. In the latter case, demand-side incentives act as catalysts for private investment in 
network rollout (Jeanjean, 2010). However, it should be noted that increasing broadband take-up 
or promoting network roll-out may not necessarily be the immediate goal of these policies, since 
some of them may be adopted with other objectives in mind, such as for instance improving the 
efficiency of the public sector, promoting ICT use by consumers and small businesses or 
enhancing e-inclusion of disadvantaged segments of the population. Each of the most relevant 
forms of demand-side intervention is considered in turn below. 
 
Public demand of specific services.  
In many countries governments have chosen to act as buyers and "lead users" of broadband 
technologies. In so doing, they increase the returns to investment in broadband, particularly in 
circumstances in which private demand is still latent, through the provision of new or improved 
e-government, e-health or e-education applications. Particularly widespread are initiatives of 
digitalization of the Public Administration, through which governments provide on-line 
information to citizens. Initiatives of this sort have been undertaken, among other countries, in 
Canada, Italy, Turkey and in Japan, where there has been an interesting attempt to radically 
improve on-line interactions between citizens and the PA.  
 
Incentives to business demand.  
This form of intervention, together with the incentives to private demand, aims at increasing 
businesses' awareness of the benefits from broadband access.  Programs of enhancement of ICT 
penetration in SMEs tend to emphasize time and cost savings deriving from the adoption of some 
broadband applications such as digital payments and e-commerce. In Finland, the support to 
business demand aims to help firms adapting their business models to new broadband 
applications. In France, it has taken the form of the set-up of industrial districts characterized by 
the presence of ultra-broadband connections ("Zones de Activité très Haut Débit"). In Germany, the 
project "Proteus" encourages the adoption of specific standards for e-business activities and the 
German government has offered prizes and consultancy services for the development of 
innovative uses of broadband technologies in SMEs.   11
 
Incentives to private demand.  
These policies are aimed at targeting "weak" segments of potential demand, characterized by a 
low propensity/ability to use novel technologies and made up primarily of housewives, 
schoolchildren and the elderly. They may take the form of IT alphabetization initiatives, 
advertizing campaigns, and/or educational vouchers. The leading nations in terms of adoption of 
this policy tool have surely been Japan (in particular with the "IT Human Resource Development 
Plan") and Korea ("10 Million People IT Education Project"), but many other nations have 
followed suit, as it is the case, for instance, for Ireland (SchoolIT2000), Mexico (Sistema Nacional e-
México) and the Czech Republic (State Information Policy in Education). Some forms of incentive to 
private demand have also targeted citizens of rural communities, as it is the case for the project 
"ConnectedNation" in the US and the project "Backing Indigenous Ability - BIA" in Australia. 
 
Demand subsidies.  
Subsidies may be provided in the form of discounts on the purchase of equipment and/or 
broadband services, direct subsidies and/or tax breaks (Jeanjean, 2010). They may target 
individual consumers or particular categories of consumers, such as it is the case when they are 
used to finance the purchase of computers for broadband connectivity by families with students, 
as in Portugal and in Hungary, or other specific population groups (female population, low-
income population, etc.) as in Greece. Moreover, they may be part of a more articulated strategy, 
as it is the case in Belgium, where policies adopted in 2006 (Internet for Everyone) and 2010 
(Start2surf@home) have allowed citizens purchasing a bundle of broadband-related services 
(computer, software and broadband connectivity) from specific consortia to enjoy tax breaks.  
 
Demand aggregation policies.  
These are schemes aimed at coordinating the potential demand of consumers in order to ensure 
efficient resource allocation and the obtainment of economies of scale, so as to increase 
profitability of network rollout. In the UK, demand aggregation is achieved through the on-line 
registration of households’ willingness to subscribe to broadband services both on British 
Telecom's website and on the government-run local development agencies. In Australia, with the 
2006 "Demand Aggregation Broker Broadband Program", the government has promoted the 
creation of various sorts of intermediaries in the process of demand aggregation (national 
brokers, officers brokers and community-based brokers). Moreover, it has also released a manual 
explain the most successful strategies in terms of demand aggregation ("Demand Aggregation 
Manual"). In Korea and Turkey, demand aggregation has taken the form of the creation of public   12
internet access points (Internet Centers in Turkey and Internet Cafés in Korea), so as to 
aggregate demand in areas where it is particularly low and dispersed.  
 
 
4.  The Empirical Analysis: Data and Variables 
 
We collect data from various sources and build a novel dataset in order to empirically 
investigate the impact of demand and supply side policies on broadband penetration. The final 
dataset covers 30 OECD countries3 and collects a rich array of country-specific information about 
policy choices, telecommunications markets, socio-economic conditions and demographic 
characteristics. We employ a cross-country panel regression model, in which the rate of 
broadband diffusion at a country level is expressed as a function of individual countries’ 
characteristics. 
As dependent variable we use the one-year differences of an index of broadband penetration 
(ΔBroadband), which measures broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants, where broadband lines 
include DSL lines, cable modem, optic fiber and LAN (source: ITU, 2010). 
As the main explanatory variables we consider both demand- and supply-side policy indicators. 
In particular, the policy variables have been obtained from the International Broadband Policies 
Database (IBPD) (Rossi, 2010), which contains information on a large set of policies (both on the 
demand and supply side) implemented in 30 OECD countries through the 1995-2010 period. The 
International Broadband Policies Database registers, for each country, the adoption of individual 
policies, their temporal duration, and whether the individual policy is relevant at a national or 
regional level. This database provides an extremely useful and innovative information source, as 
previous databases were developed only for specific individual years or countries. Specifically, the 
IBP database covers six types of policies on the supply side, and 5 types of policies on the demand 
side.  
On the supply side the following policies are included: (i) adoption of fiscal incentives programs 
and subsidies (FiscalInc), (ii) implementation of long-term loans programs for broadband suppliers 
and national financing programs (LTLoans), (iii) creation of Public-Private Partnerships with 
public ownership of the infrastructure network (PublicNetPPP), (iv) creation of Public-Private 
Partnerships with private ownership of the infrastructure network (PrivateNetPPP), (v) 
                                                        
3 Countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom (UK), United 
States of America (USA).   13
implementation of territorial mapping programs (MapPrograms), and (vi) initiatives of 
administrative simplification (AdmSimpl).  
On the demand side the following policies are included: (i) initiatives of public demand of specific 
services (PubDemServices), (ii) provision of incentives to business demand (IncBusinessDem), (iii) 
provision of incentives to private demand (IncPrivateDem), (iv) provision of demand subsidies in 
favor of individual consumers or particular categories of consumers (DemSubsidies), and (v) 
adoption of demand aggregation policies (DemAggregation).  
As one can notice, the IBPD’s database covers most of the relevant policy measures for the 
promotion of broadband penetration that countries have adopted in the last fifteen years, and so it 
allows us to perform an exhaustive evaluation of the public intervention at a country level. In the 
IBPD’s database, the adoption of each policy is codified as a discrete variable which takes the value 
of 1 if the individual policy measure is directed to a population share in between 0.5 and 25 
percent of the total national population (i.e. it has local or regional relevance), 2 if it is directed to 
a population share greater than 25 percent of the total national population (i.e. it has a national 
wide relevance), 0 otherwise (i.e. it has no significant relevance).  
The database offers yearly data, where the adoption of each policy is measured for each year in 
which the given intervention was in placed. The database also deals with the possibility of missing 
information regarding the duration of specific initiatives. In the database, two different coding 
strategies are followed in order to account for missing information. When only the information on 
the given year in which a policy initiative was launched is available (and the information on the 
duration of the initiative is not), according to a first strategy, the individual policy intervention is 
considered as being in place in all the years subsequent to the launch of the policy, while, 
according to a second strategy, the individual policy intervention is considered as being in place 
only in the given year in which the policy started. In our study we use the coding produced 
according to the first strategy, and then check the robustness of the estimation results to the 
second coding strategy.  
Finally, we also consider two aggregate indicators for supply and demand side policies (again 
provided by the IBPD’s (2010) database), which are built – for each country and year – as an un-
weighted sum, respectively, of the six individual supply-side policy records and of the five 
individual demand-side policy records. Two aggregate indicators are so obtained: a supply side 
policy index (SuppSidePolicies) and a demand side policy index (DemSidePolicies), both of which are 
provided, again, according to the two different coding strategies previously described in order to 
account for missing information problems.   14
As control variables we consider a set of covariates measuring three dimensions possibly 
relevant for broadband diffusion, as suggested by the literature: telecommunications market 
characteristics, socio-economic conditions and demographic dynamics. 
As telecommunications market characteristics we consider: the number of mobile cellular 
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (MobileDiffusion; source: ITU (2010)), which we consider as a 
rough proxy for technological competition as suggested, among others, by Cava-Ferreruela and 
Alabau-Munoz (2006); the number of fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants (FixedDiffusion; 
source: ITU (2010)); the ratio of mobile cellular subscriptions to fixed telephone lines 
(MobFixRatio; source: ITU (2010)); the number of fixed Internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
(InternetSubscr; source: ITU (2010)); the number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants 
(InternetUsers; source: ITU (2010)); the level of liberalization in the telecommunications industry 
(Liberalization), measured as the reverse of the entry barriers to market index provided by OECD 
(2009); the level of privatization in the telecommunications industry (Privatization), measured as 
the reverse of the public ownership index provided by OECD (2009); and the level of competition 
in the telecommunications industry (Competition), measured through a composite index which 
expresses a weighted average of the market share of new entrants in the trunk telephony market, 
in the international telephony market, and in the mobile market (source: OECD, 2009).   
As socio-economic characteristics we include the following variables: the degree of openness of 
the economy (OpenEc), measured as total trade – i.e. sum of import and export – as a percentage of 
GDP (source: Armingeon et al. (2010)); the gross domestic product growth rate (GdpGrowth; 
source: Armingeon et al. (2010)); the unemployment rate (Unemployment; source: Armingeon et al. 
(2010)); the civilian employment in services as a percentage of total civilian employment 
(EmplServices; source: Armingeon et al. (2010)); the tertiary school enrollment (TertiaryEduc), 
measured as the ratio of total enrollment in tertiary education institutions, regardless of age, to 
the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown (source: 
World Bank, 2010), we use this variable as a proxy for informatics alphabetization; and the degree 
of decentralization of the State administrative structure (Federalism), measured through a discrete 
index that ranges from 0, if federalism is absent and centralization strong, to 2, if federalism is 
strong (source: Armingeon et al. (2010)). 
As demographic variables, finally, we use information on: population aged between 15 and 64 
years, expressed as a percentage of total population (Pop15-64; source: Armingeon et al. (2010)); 
population density per squared kilometer (PopDensity; source: ITU (2010)); urban population 
(PopUrban), measured as the population in cities with more than 1 million inhabitants expressed as 
a percentage of the total country’s population (source: World Bank (2010)); female population   15
(PopFemale), i.e. the number of females as a percentage of total population (source: World Bank 
(2010)). 
Table 1 reports a descriptive summary of the dataset. 
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
5.  The Empirical analysis: methodology and results 
 
5.1 Basic regression methodology 
The objective of the empirical analysis is to investigate the effect (if any) of both demand and 
supply side policies on the degree of broadband adoption in OECD countries, in order to suggest 
suitable public interventions for enhancing broadband diffusion. Specifically, here we aim at 
measuring how and to which extent public policies can explain, from a statistical point of view, the 
variability of an index of broadband penetration across 30 OECD countries over the 1999-2009 
period, also taking into account the possible effect of telecommunications market conditions and of 
other socio-economic and demographic characteristics of individual countries.4 A s  w e  h a v e  
mentioned in the previous section, we use the one-year differences of an index of broadband 
penetration (ΔBroadband) as the dependent variable in our econometric model. The use of a one-
year differentiated variable allows us to estimate precisely the effect of the presence of a given 
policy intervention in a certain year on the change of the (yearly) level of broadband adoption with 
respect to the preceding year. 
We perform a basic regression analysis, in which the one-year changes in broadband diffusion 
are studied econometrically across all the 30 OECD countries included in our dataset over the 
entire 1995-2010 period. Thus, as a result we will obtain an estimate of the effect of an increase in 
the policy indicators on the dependent variable, averaged across the whole considered country 
sample and time period.  
Formally, we consider the following cross-country panel model:  
                                                        
4 While IBPD’s (2010) data cover the 1995-2010 period, broadband diffusion data for OECD countries are available 
for the years from 1999 to 2009, thus in our econometric analysis we finally study the 1999- 2009 period. Notice that 
we encounter some missing data (for given years and countries) for some variables and therefore end up with an 
unbalanced panel (depending on the variables used the sample size changes across the various model specifications 
that we consider). As panel analysis methods allow to tackle unbalanced panels, our estimation results do not suffer 
from biasness problems, that we check for through traditional diagnostic procedures.    16
ΔBroadbandit = β0 + Σk βk Kit + Σl βl Lit + Σm βm Mit + Σn βn Nit + Σr βr Rit + ci + εit               
(1) 
with t = 1995, 1996, …, 2010, and where i identifies the country, K is a vector of supply-side 
policy indicators, L is a vector of demand side policy indicators, M i s  a  v e c t o r  o f  
telecommunications industry’s market conditions, N is a vector of socio-economic variables, R is a 
vector of demographic characteristics, β0…r defines the parametric structure of the equation, ci 
captures the country-specific effects (that soak up the variability in the data due to time invariant 
unobservable country factors), and where εit are idiosyncratic disturbances that change across 
countries (i) and years (t).  
Note that, as a baseline estimation method, we perform a random-effects estimation, in which 
individual country heterogeneity is explicitly incorporated into the model, by treating the 
unobserved effects as random draws from the population. This approach is commonly preferred to 
a fixed-effects estimation from the so-called ‘omitted variables’ or ‘neglected heterogeneity’ 
perspective (Wooldridge, 2002).5 
 
 
5.2  Baseline models’ estimation results 
 
Broadband penetration (at a country level) is potentially affected by a very large set of variables. 
In our study we try to take into account all the possibly relevant aspects. As a result, we include in 
the analysis a set of individual supply- and demand-side polices along with three vectors each 
containing a sub-set of variables, in order to control for telecommunications markets, socio-
economic and demographic factors.  
This rich array of variables, however, prevents us from estimating a full model containing all the 
predictors as, by doing so, our estimation would suffer from a large loss of degrees of freedom. 
Thus, we undertake an empirical strategy according to which the relevant variables are selected 
through a three-step estimation strategy.  
                                                        
5 We have checked, through the Hausman test, the statistical validity of the assumption of orthogonality between the 
random effects and the regressors, which is made in the random effects model. In some of the model specifications that 
we consider, the results of the Hausman test allows us to statistically accept the null hypothesis of random effects 
estimation’s parameters consistent and efficient versus a fixed effects estimation’s parameters. Those specifications for 
which the Hausman’s null hypothesis is rejected are estimated through a fixed effects estimation based on a “within 
transformation”, according to which the (generic) constant term is estimated as an average of the unobserved 
components.   17
In a first step, we investigate econometrically the relationship between each individual policy 
intervention and the one-year changes of broadband diffusion. In this way we show how individual 
policy measures relate to broadband penetration. In a second step, we employ the aggregate 
supply- and demand-side policy indicators (so as to reduce the overall number of policy 
regressors), and check the statistical effect of such aggregate indexes on broadband diffusion 
controlling for individual country characteristics. In the third step, finally, we select those control 
variables that are shown to potentially affect broadband adoption in the second step, and construct 
extended model versions in which redundant regressors are not included. 
Results are presented in tables from 2 to 5. In each table, while the first column lists the 
variables, the remaining columns report estimated parameters and standard errors. Where a fixed 
effects estimation is performed (notice that the choice between random and fixed effects model is 
made on the base of the Hausman test’s results, reported at the bottom of each table), standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
i.  Individual public policies’ effects 
Table 2 shows two important results. On the one hand, only three supply-side interventions 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on ΔBroadband: they are the implementation of 
long-term loans programs for broadband suppliers and national financing programs (LTLoans), 
and the creation of Public-Private Partnerships with both public or private ownership of the 
infrastructure network (respectively, PublicNetPPP and PrivateNetPPP). The other supply side 
policy measures seem to have lower effects on ΔBroadband, and such effects (if any) do not turn out 
to be statistically significant: this is t h e  c a s e  o f  f i s c a l  i n c e n t i v e s  p r o g r a m s  ( FiscalInc), 
implementation of territorial mapping programs (MapPrograms), and administrative simplification 
(AdmSimpl). On the other hand, all the demand-side policies that we have considered are shown to 
affect the one-year broadband diffusion changes: initiatives of public demand of specific services 
(PubDemServices), the provision of incentives to business demand (IncBusinessDem) or to private 
demand (IncPrivateDem), the provision of demand subsidies in favor of individual consumers or 
particular categories of consumers (DemSubsidies), and the adoption of demand aggregation 
policies (DemAggregation) all have a positive and statistically significant effect on ΔBroadband. 
Moreover, unreported estimations in which we used the alternative coding provided by the 
IBPD’s (2010) database show substantially similar results, so suggesting that different treatments 
of missing information do not significantly affect the parameter estimates. 
   18
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 
ii.  Aggregate policy indexes’ effects and selection of control variables 
Table 3 reports the estimation results obtained from a set of model specifications in which 
individual control covariates (measuring telecommunications markets, socio-economic and 
demographic factors) are added to the two aggregate indicators for supply and demand side 
policies.  
As a main result, we obtain that both the aggregate supply- and demand-side policy indexes 
(respectively,  SuppSidePolicies and DemSidePolicies) have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on broadband diffusion changes at a country level. This is shown by all the model 
specifications reported in Table 3. Only in the model specifications reported in columns (I) and 
(IV), the parameter associated to the index for supply-side policies does not turn out to be 
statistically significant.  
Secondly, estimation results reported in Table 3 unveil which explanatory controls might have a 
statistically significant effect on ΔBroadband. Among those variables that describe 
telecommunications markets’ characteristics, we find that the number of mobile cellular 
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (MobileDiffusion), which we consider as a rough proxy for 
technological competition, has a positive impact on broadband penetration, along with the number 
of fixed Internet subscribers and users per 100 inhabitants (InternetSubscr and InternetUsers). The 
degree of competition in the telecommunications industry also emerges as an important 
dimension: on the one side, indeed, we find that the level of legal liberalization in the 
telecommunications industry (Liberalization) has a positive effect on ΔBroadband; on the other, the 
actual competition in the market (Competition) appears statistically relevant as well. Privatization 
levels (Privatization), instead, do not have statistically significant influences. Among those 
variables that capture socio-economic factors, we detect a positive and statistically significant 
effect for the rate of enrollment in tertiary education institutions (TertiaryEduc), for the level of 
unemployment (Unemployment) and for the share of civilian employees in services (EmplServices). 
Other variables, such as the degree of economic openness (OpenEc), GDP growth (GdpGrowth) and 
administrative decentralization (Federalism) do not seem to play a statistically significant role. As 
for demographic dynamics, finally, higher quotas of population aged between 15 and 64 years 
(Pop15-64) result to be statistically associated to higher levels in the broadband diffusion changes, 
while higher quotas of female population (PopFemale) to lower ones. 
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[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
iii.  Aggregate policy indexes’ effects controlling for vectors of country characteristics 
Table 4 presents estimation results obtained by using extended model versions in which 
redundant regressors are not included. In particular, we consider four model specifications, where 
the explanatory variables (both policy indicators and control regressors) are added through 
vectors of multiple variables. Models presented in columns from (I) to (III) of Table 4 include 
supply- and demand-side policy indicators along with a vector capturing, respectively, relevant 
telecommunications markets, socio-economic and demographic factors. Model specification (IV) 
includes the supply- and demand-side policy indexes and those variables that are shown to be 
associated to a statistically significant parameter in the model specifications from (I) to (III). 
Moreover, notice that in all the models from (I) to (IV) of Table 4 we have also considered a one-
year lagged supply side policy index (SuppSidePoliciesit-1), in order to control for delayed effects of 
supply-side public interventions.6 
 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Estimation results presented in Table 4 show that demand-side policies (DemSidePolicies) always 
have a positive and statistically significant impact on ΔBroadband, both when the control vectors 
are considered one by one (see specifications from (I) to (III)) and when they are included 
simultaneously (see specification (IV), where those regressors that were previously shown to be 
non-significant are excluded). On the contrary, supply side policies turn out to have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on broadband adoption only when one-year lagged policies are 
considered (SuppSidePoliciesit-1) and when controlling for socio-economic and demographic factors, 
while when also telecommunications markets characteristics are included both SuppSidePoliciesit-1 
and SuppSidePoliciesit are not associated to statistically significant parameters.  
As for the control variables, Table 4 also confirms that mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants (MobileDiffusion), the actual degree of competition in the market (Competition), and the 
level of civilian employees in services (EmplServices) all act as a positive and statistically significant 
influence on the rate of broadband adoption. These latter results reveal the crucial role of both 
                                                        
6 Although both the number of fixed Internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants (InternetSubscr) and the number of 
Internet users per 100 inhabitants (InternetUsers) were previously shown to be associated to a statistically significant 
parameter, here we consider only InternetUsers, given that InternetUsers and InternetSubscr show a high correlation 
coefficient (ρ = 0.857, p-value = 0.000; this implying collinearity problems).    20
technological and inter-firm competition for the enhancement of broadband penetration, along 
with a demand-specific factor (i.e. the relevance of the service sector in the economy). Instead, the 
remaining variables (InternetUsers,  Liberalization,  Unemployment,  TertiaryEduc,  Pop15-64, and 
PopFemale) do not appear to have statistically significant effects once they are included 
simultaneously into the model. 
 
5.3  Quantile regression analysis: policy timing and sequencing 
 
Another important issue to be considered when analyzing the impact of broadband policies, is 
whether a different policy design is needed according to the level of existing broadband diffusion. 
For instance, supply and/or demand-side policies may have a rather different impact under a low 
rate of broadband penetration relative to the one they can extert under high levels of broadband 
diffusion.  
In order to tackle this problem, in this section we perform a quantile regression analysis 
(Koenker and Basset, 1978). Quantile regression is a statistical technique intended to conduct 
inference about conditional quantile functions. Just as traditional linear regression methods enable 
one to estimate models for conditional mean functions, quantile regression techniques offer a 
mechanism for estimating models for the conditional median and other conditional quantile 
functions. Thus, quantile regression enables us to provide a more complete statistical analysis of 
the stochastic relationships among variables.  
Here, in particular, we estimate the effect of supply and demand-side policies (and of a set of 
control regressors) on the level of broadband diffusion corresponding to the median value of 
broadband penetration for our sample, and to the levels corresponding to the 3rd and the 7th 
quantile. We choose the 3rd and the 7th quantile since they identify two quantiles equally distant 
from the median and since they do not refer to extreme values of the distribution. The dependent 
variable we use here is the level of broadband penetration (Broadband), rather than its one-year 
changes. As a byproduct, hence, the 3rd, the 5th and the 7th quantile that we consider in our 
regression will correspond to three different stages of the broadband market development, defined 
in terms of rate of broadband adoption (say low, middle and advanced broadband adoption).  
The linear conditional quantile function is estimated by solving: 
β(τ) = argmin β ∈ R Σi ρτ (Broadbandit – x'it β)                                                                                  
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for any quantile τ (between 0 and 1), where the quantity β(τ) is called the τ-th regression quantile, 
ρ(•) is the function that yields the τ-th sample quantile as its solution, and x' identifies a generic 
covariate. 
Estimated parameters from quantile regressions are presented in Table 5. Interesting results are 
obtained. 
First, quantile regression findings show that, while supply-side policies have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on broadband diffusion only if one-year lagged and only for the 3rd 
and 5th quantile, demand-side policies do exert a positive influence for all the quantiles considered. 
Moreover, the estimated coefficient for demand-side policies increases throughout the three 
considered quantiles of the broadband diffusion distribution (always being statistically significant). 
This result is particularly informative as it provide suggestions as to the appropriate policy 
sequencing to be adopted. When the broadband market is at its first stages of development (i.e. the 
levels of broadband penetration are low), both supply- and demand-side policies have a positive 
effect, with supply-side policies showing one-year delayed effects.  
When broadband diffusion increases up to our sample average, again, both one-year lagged 
supply-side policies and demand-side interventions continue to play a positive and statistically 
significant role, with however the estimated effect of supply-side policies being reduced (from 
0.862 to 0.676) and that of demand-side policies being increased (from 0.659 to 0.905). Finally, 
when the telecommunications market reaches an advanced stage of development (i.e. our 7th 
sample quantile), only demand-side policies appear to have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the rate of broadband adoption, and such effect is shown to be higher than that exerted in 
the previous stages of market development. 
Second, quantile regressions confirm the positive influence played by technological competition 
(which we measure through the rate of mobile subscribers, MobileDiffusion) and confirm the 
influential role of market competition (Competition). In particular, although always positive, the 
magnitude of the effect of market competition seems to follow a non linear path throughout the 
stages of the broadband market development. Indeed, the estimated coefficient of Competition for 
the 3rd quintile is around 1.4, then it decreases to 1.2 in correspondence of the 5th quintile, and 
again it grows to 1.7 at the 7th quintile.  
Third, finally, the level of civilian employees in services (EmplServices) is shown to act as a 
positive and statistically significant influence on the rate of broadband adoption for all the three 
quintiles that we have considered. Furthermore, the estimated parameter increases significantly 
from the 3rd to the 7th quintile (where it is equal, respectively, to 17.1 and 46.6). This result further 
highlights the relevance of demand-side factors for broadband diffusion.    22
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Broadband penetration is widely perceived as having a significant potential for economic growth. 
However, the empirical research on the most appropriate public policy design needed to enhance 
broadband penetration, is still in its infancy. The objective of this paper has been to attempt to fill 
this gap, by providing an empirical analysis, based on a unique and novel dataset, of the relative 
effectiveness of a wide range of supply-side and demand-side policy interventions aimed at 
stimulating broadband penetration.  
So-far, the lack of empirical analyses specifically focused on the policy side of the broadband 
debate may be motivated by a number of reasons that include the difficulty of gathering adequate 
information for a number of countries sufficient to make the analysis meaningful in a policy 
context that is permanently in flux. One of the strengths of this paper is that it relies on a dataset 
(IBPD) assembled on the basis of such time-consuming process of information-gathering. Indeed, 
the data on the policies adopted in the 30 OECD countries considered in the study have been 
carefully retrieved on the basis of an extensive analysis of the existing academic literature, of 
consulting firms’ reports, official documents and governments’ and newspapers’ websites.  
The present paper makes a first step in the direction of providing some information that 
may constitute the basis for effective broadband policy interventions. The results of the analysis 
are good news for policy-makers. Indeed, differently from the scant existing empirical evidence 
mentioned, we show that public policies do exert a positive influence on broadband penetration. 
This holds for both demand-side and supply-side policies. In other words, the efforts undertaken 
by most OECD governments appear to be well-grounded. At a time in which the financial crisis 
made governments’ budget constraints ever more binding, the renewed impetus for the adoption 
of infrastructure-centred Keynesian policies, thus finds in broadband policies a successful agenda 
to be implemented.   
Two conclusions from our findings may be most useful to policy-makers in the short term. 
The first is that demand-side policies show, on the aggregate, to have greater impact on 
broadband penetration than supply-side interventions, especially when endogeneity issues are 
explicitly addressed. This is to some extent surprising, in light of the fact that most of the 
attention has been historically placed on supply-side interventions, with demand-side 
interventions being considered a useful, though not essential, component of a broadband policy 
plans.  
The second, and most important, is that the adoption of piecemeal policies does not take 
too far. Governments electing broadband penetration as a worthy policy goal should take   23
seriously the existence of complementarities among the various policy tools available, and 
particularly among demand-side and supply-side policies. Policy interventions should be devised 
in the context of an overall articulated strategy that combines elements of demand-side and 
supply-side stimulus. In particular, our quantile regression shows that appropriate policy 
sequencing shall be adopted, according to the initial conditions faced in each country. When the 
broadband market is at its first stages of development, and the levels of broadband penetration 
are low), both supply and demand-side policies have a positive effect, with supply-side policies 
showing one-year delayed effects. However, when broadband diffusion increases demand-side 
policies appear to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the rate of broadband 
adoption, and such effect is shown to be higher than that exerted in the previous stages of market 
development. Other ‘initial conditions’ which affect policy’s performance are given by the level of 
technological competition on the one hand, and of market competition on the other. In particular, 
although always positive, the magnitude of the effect of market competition follows a non linear 
path throughout the stages of the broadband penetration development, being high for initial and 
mature stage, and lower for intermediate levels of broadband penetration. Finally, the relevance 
of demand-side factors for broadband diffusion is confirmed by the role played by the level of 
civilian employees in services, which positively influence the rate of broadband penetration at any 
stage of broadband diffusion. 
We believe that our results provide new insights into the policy debate and in particular 
by outlining the rationale of a selective policy design for broadband penetration and, in 
perspective, for the rollout of next-generation networks, based on the complementarity of supply-
side and demand-side, according to country-specific conditions. 
One limit of our analysis is that the dataset we use, does not cover so-far wireless 
broadband policies adopted in the sample of countries we study. We are aware that this might be 
a remarkable weakness for our policy implications, as the complementarity between wireline and 
wireless broadband diffusion is clearly a fundamental issue, especially with reference to future 
policies aimed at reducing the digital divide. Future research shall focus on such a neglected issue, 
in order to improve our understanding of the optimal degree of complementarity between 
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Table 1. Control variables’ description.  
  VARIABLE'S NAME    VARIABLE'S DEFINITION    SOURCE   M EAN    S.D. 























FiscalInc     Fiscal incentives programs    IBPD (2010)   0.083    0.394 
LTLoans     Long-term loans programs     IBPD (2010)    0.804    0.968 
PublicNetPPP    PPP with network’s public ownership     IBPD (2010)    0.450    0.757 
PrivateNetPPP    PPP with network’s private ownership    IBPD (2010)    0.177    0.559 
MapPrograms    Territorial mapping programs    IBPD (2010)    0.016    0.170 
AdmSimpl     Administrative simplification     IBPD (2010)    0.043    0.289 
SuppSidePolicies     Supply side policies aggregate index    IBPD (2010)    1.575    1.793 























PubDemServices     Public demand of specific services     IBPD (2010)    1.393    0.907 
IncBusinessDem     Incentives to business demand     IBPD (2010)    0.227    0.630 
IncPrivateDem     Incentives to private demand     IBPD (2010)    0.887    0.960 
DemSubsidies     Demand subsidies for consumers     IBPD (2010)    0.204    0.599 
DemAggregation     Demand aggregation policies     IBPD (2010)    0.541    0.324 
DemSidePolicies     Demand side policies aggregate index    IBPD (2010)    2.759    2.102 

























MobileDiffusion     Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 inh.)    ITU (2010)    83.712    30.115 
FixedDiffusion     Fixed telephone lines (per 100 inh.)     ITU (2010)    47.805    13.335 
MobFixRatio     Mobile to fixed lines ratio    ITU (2010)    1.883    0.958 
InternetSubscr     Fixed Internet subscribers (per 100 inh.)    ITU (2010)    19.877    10.758 
InternetUsers     Internet users (per 100 inh.)     ITU (2010)    49.624    24.038 
Liberalization     Telecommunications industry’s liberalization    OECD (2009)    4.649    2.122 
Privatization     Telecommunications industry’s privatization    OECD (2009)    3.610    2.227 
Competition     Level of competition in the industry    OECD (2009)    2.358    1.368 
































  OpenEc     Degree of economic openness (% of GDP)    Armingeon et al. (2010)    85.670    51.831 
GdpGrowth     GDP growth rate (%)    Armingeon et al. (2010)    2.949    1.970 
Unemployment     Unemployment rate (%)    Armingeon et al. (2010)    6.674    3.394 
EmplServices     Employment in services (% of total empl.)    Armingeon et al. (2010)    0.687    0.059 
TertiaryEduc     Tertiary schools enrollment (% relevant pop.)    World Bank (2010)    56.936    18.156 
Federalism     Index of administrative decentralization    Armingeon et al. (2010)    0.571    0.850 




























Pop15-64     Population aged 15-64 (% of total pop.)    Armingeon et al. (2010)    0.668    0.012 
PopDensity     Individuals per Km2    ITU (2010)    131.95    121.51 
PopUrban     Urban population (% of total pop.)    World Bank (2010)    26.146    13.803 
PopFemale     Female population (% of total pop.)    World Bank (2010)    50.351    0.563 
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Table 2. Individual public policies’ effects (cross-country panel model estimates). 
VARIABLE (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII)  (IX)  (X)  (XI) 
   ||------------------------ SUPPLY SIDE POLICIES ------------------------------||  ||------------------- DEMAND SIDE POLICIES ------------------|| 
DEP. VAR.: 























                      
FiscalInc it   -0.164 
(0.350) 




                 
PublicNetPPP it      0.646 
(0.162) a 
               
PrivateNetPPP it 
      0.519 
(0.210) b 
             
MapPrograms it          -0.028 
(0.576) 
           
AdmSimpl  it 
          0.150 
(0.361) 
         
PubDemServices  it             0.350   
(0.191) c 
       
IncBusinessDem  it                0.633 
(0.136) a 
     
IncPrivateDem  it                  0.457 
(0.138) a 
   
DemSubsidies  it                    1.059 
(0.175) a 
 
DemAggregation  it                      0.993  
(0.349) a 
                       






















                       
Number  of  obs.  300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
Country effects  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random 
Hausman test: [prob. > chi2]  0.12 [0.72]  0.15 [0.70]  1.41 [0.23] 0.10  [0.74] 1.17  [0.28] 2.51  [0.11] 1.16  [0.28] H0 rejected  1.34 [0.24]  H0 rejected  1.33 [0.24] 
Prob. > F  -- -- -- -- -- -- --  0.000  --  0.000  -- 
R-squared (between)  0.012  0.138  0.174  0.104  0.036  0.059  0.016  0.196  0.034  0.013  0.058 




Table 3. Aggregate policy indexes’ effects and selection of control variables (cross-country panel model estimates). 
VARIABLE (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII)  (IX)  (X)  (XI)  (XII)  (XII)  (XIV)  (XV)  (XVI) (XVII)  (XVIII) 
DEP. VAR.: 















































































































MobileDiffusion  it 
0.017 
(0.006) a 
                                
FixedDiffusion  it 
  0.024 
(0.026) 
                              
MobFixRatio  it 
    0.241 
(0.160) 
                            
InternetSubscr  it 
      0.085 
(0.012) a 
                          
InternetUsers  it 
        0.029 
(0.008) a 
                        
Liberalization  it 
          0.456 
(0.113) a 
                      
Privatization  it 
            0.297 
(0.190) 
                    
Competition  it 
              1.777 
(0.341) a 
                  
OpenEc  it 
                0.012 
(0.022) 
                
GdpGrowth  it 
                  -0.015 
(0.094) 
              
Unemployment  it 
                    0.290 
(0.168) c 
            
EmplServices  it 
                      53.871 
(12.391)a 
          
TertiaryEduc  it 
                        0.100 
(0.027) a 
        
Federalism  it 
                          0.185 
(0.223) 
      
Pop15-64 it 
                            56.880 
(34.140)c 
    
PopDensity it  








                                  -8.533 
(2.186) a 
                                    








































(Table 3 continued) 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII)  (IX)  (X)  (XI)  (XII)  (XII)  (XIV)  (XV)  (XVI) (XVII)  (XVIII) 
Number  of  obs.  300 300 300 263 300 232 232 232 168 185 189 189 171 189 189 300  52  210 
County effects  Fixed  Fixed Fixed  Random  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Random  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed  Fixed Random Fixed 
Hausman test:  
[p. > chi2] 
H0 rej.  H0 rej. H0 rej.  4.21 
[0.23] 
H0 rej.  H0 rej.  H0 rej.  H0 rej.  H0 rej.  5.99 
[0.11] 
H0 rej.  H0 rej.  H0 rej.  H0 rej.  H0 rej.  H0 rej. 1.80 
[0.61] 
H0 rej. 
Prob. > F  0.000 0.000 0.000  --  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  --  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  --  0.000 
R-sq. (between) 0.166  0.313  0.040 0.799  0.569  0.278  0.035  0.193  0.080  0.051  0.008  0.632  0.304  0.065  0.011  0.022 0.534 0.155 





















Table 4. Aggregate policy indexes’ effects and vectors of control variables (cross-country panel model estimates). 
 V ARIABLE (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
   DEP. VAR.: 









           
Policy indexes 
























           
Tlc market factors 
MobileDiffusion  it  0.029 
(0.013) b 
    0.058 
(0.009) a 
InternetUsers  it 
0.021 
(0.018) 
     
Liberalization  it  -0.172 
(0.149) 
     
Competition  it  0.675 
(0.394) c 
    0.661 
(0.290) b 
           
Socio-economic factors 
Unemployment  it 
  0.054 
(0.102) 
  0.089 
(0.086) 
EmplServices  it 
  18.269 
(4.907) a 
  14.252 
(4.668) a 
TertiaryEduc  it 
  0.043 
(0.015) a 
  0.009 
(0.016) 
           
Demographic factors 
Pop15-64 it 








           








           
  Number of obs.  232 116  147  116 
  Country effects  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random 
  Hausman test: [prob. > chi2]  H0 rejected  1.23 [0.97]  H0 rejected  2.89 [0.96] 
  Prob. > F  0.000 --  0.000  -- 
  R-squared (between)  0.530 0.371  0.060  0.561 
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Statistical significance: a = 0.01; b = 0.5; c = 0.10.  




Table 5. Quantile regression results. 








   DEP. VAR.: 
Broadband it   Coeff. (Std.Err.)  Coeff. (Std.Err.)  Coeff. (Std.Err.) 
         
Policy indexes 


















         
Tlc market factors 













         
Socio-economic factors 



















         






         






         
  Number of obs.  136 136  136 
  Pseudo R-squared   0.286  0.362  0.389 
         
Statistical significance: a = 0.01; b = 0.5; c = 0.10.  
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